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INTRODUCTION
In March 2015, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington decided Sierra Club v. McLerran, a case involving
something known as a total maximum daily load ("TMDL").' TMDLs are
pollution budgets for impaired waterways, and they are, in theory, a key
mechanism for bringing those water bodies into compliance with water
quality standards. 2 They are also mandatory. Clean Water Act section
303(d) leaves little doubt that states must prepare TMDLs for water bodies
that do not meet water quality standards, and that the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") must step in should a state fail to act.3
1. 2015 WL 1188522 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
2. See JOHN HORNBEEK ET AL., IMPLEMENTING TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS:
UNDERSTANDING AND FOSTERING SUCCESSFUL RESULTS 13 (2008) ("The federal TMDL program plays
a central role in the nation's water quality management efforts."); Memorandum from Robert
Perciasepe, Assistant Adm'r U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Reg'1 Adm'rs and Reg'1 Water Div. Adm'rs,
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency on New Policies for Establishing and Implementing Total Maximum Daily
Loads, http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
10/documents/2003_10_21_tmdl ratepacel997guido.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX9U-29WF] ("The
TMDL program is crucial to success because it brings rigor, accountability, and statutory authority to
the process.").
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2012) (beginning with "each state shall").
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For the Spokane River, however, the Washington Department of
Ecology and EPA honored that mandate only through what might appear to
be a blatant breach. The department had begun a TMDL for polychlorinated
biphenals, a group of pollutants impairing the river. But then, and with
EPA's acquiescence, it suspended the TMDL writing process indefinitely.4
That suspension did not derive from a lack of interest in responding to the
river's pollution problems-or, at least, the department admitted no such
thing. Instead, the department asserted that its resources would be best
spent on developing a plan to restore the river.5 The TMDL, in other words,
would be a sideshow, a distraction, and the best course would be to skip the
TMDL and go straight to implementation planning, which normally is the
next step in the regulatory sequence. This was not the first time regulators
had preferred this course of action, or expressed skepticism about the value
of TMDLs.6 Similar things have been said in many ways, perhaps none
more concise than the brief words a guest speaker-a municipal stormwater
manager and committed environmentalist-once offered to my
environmental law class: "TMDLs suck."
This article considers whether my guest speaker, and the Washington
Department of Ecology, might have been right. It asks what tens of
thousands of TMDLs have actually done to protect the environment. And
while the most accurate answer to that question would be, "we don't
know," the evidence we do have is somewhat discouraging. Twenty years
ago, TMDLs were, in some quarters, the great hope of water quality law."
Now, however, the water quality problems that spurred so much interest in
TMDLs still persist.9 And despite some positive individual examples-one
4. McLerran, 2015 WL 1188522, at *2-*4 (describing the administrative process, which
involved a draft TMDL that never was finalized).
5. Water Quality Improvement Project Spokane River: PCBs, WASH. DEP'T ECOLOGY,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wq/tmdl/spokaneriver/SpokPCBTMDL.html [https://perma.cc/25PD-
K9CT] (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). The Department of Ecology explains, "Rather than develop a TMDL
for PCBs, Ecology is pursuing direct actions to lower PCB loading into the Spokane River. Because
establishing a TMDL with wasteload allocations can take many generations to meet and may take a
decade or more to establish, Ecology feels that taking steps to reduce toxics immediately is more
effective at achieving the desired water quality goal." Id.
6. See Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U.
COLO. L. REV. 431, 453-54 (2011) (describing Maine regulators' frustrations with TMDLs for urban
stormwater).
7. I will not name names, so readers will just have to trust in the accuracy of my memory.
8. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from
the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 203, 204-05 (1999) (asserting the Clean Water Act's
TMDL requirements "stand[] out as having sufficient promise to meet this challenge" of integrated
water quality regulation); Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe to Reg'l Adm'rs and Reg'l Water Div.
Adm'rs, supra note 2.
9. See National Summary of State Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/tmdl waters10/attains nation cy.control [https://perma.cc/7BJU-SRR8] (last
846 [Vol. 17
TMDL Introduction
of which is the focus of the rest of this symposium issue-there is little
evidence that TMDLs can claim any credit for systemic pollution
reductions.' 0
That dearth of demonstrated accomplishments raises uncomfortable
questions. Why do we not have more evidence of success? Has a massive
amount of effort been wasted? And what can we learn, at this still-
preliminary stage, from TMDLs? Despite the informational deficits that
prevent definitive answers, there are some lessons to be drawn. They just
reflect basic common sense: construct your statutes well and, if you are an
environmental group, pick your litigation battles carefully. But what these
lessons lack in originality, they make up in importance.
These may all sound dark and pessimistic, particularly for a symposium
celebrating TMDLs. And the conclusions do come with important caveats.
Clearly, some TMDLs already have major accomplishments to their
credit. " With others-including very important ones like the Lake
Champlain TMDL-there is reason for cautious optimism. And, most
importantly, there is a huge difference between the absence of evidence of
success and affirmative evidence of failure. It may well be that the right
studies just haven't been done yet, and that if we examine TMDLs in
different ways, we will learn about undiscovered achievements. 12 But
optimism, though somewhat justified, ought to be tempered. In fifty years,
environmental lawyers may yet look back upon the United States' massive
TMDL experiment as a success. But environmental advocates also should
consider the possibility that the TMDL story is, more than anything else, a
cautionary tale.
I. LAUNCHING THE TMDL PROGRAM
The obligation to prepare TMDLs springs from section 303 of the
Clean Water Act. " Section 303 obligates states to set water quality
standards, to identify water bodies that fail to meet those standards, and to
create TMDLs for each non-attaining water body.'4 As its name suggests,
the TMDL should function as a daily pollutant budget: it specifies the mass
of each offending pollutant that a waterway can accommodate-with a
visited Apr. 5, 2016) (summarizing water quality monitoring data, and showing widespread
impairment).
10. See infra Section II.
11. See, e.g., infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (describing the Garcia River
TMDL).
12. See infra note 58 and accompanying text (suggesting possible research projects).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
14. Id.
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margin of safety-while still attaining water quality standards.'" Section
303 also obliges states to adopt continuing planning processes designed, in
theory, to turn the budgets contained in TMDLs into actual pollution
controls.' The whole system exemplifies what some commentators refer to
as an "ambient" approach to pollution control: the idea is to identify the
level of pollution a system can tolerate and then reverse engineer that
outcome through controls on individual sources.
For many years, as Oliver Houck has explained in wonderful detail, this
approach was the forgotten stepchild of the Clean Water Act.' The act also
includes a permitting program, known as the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES"), that employs technology-based controls
on "point sources"-generally outfalls from factories, wastewater treatment
plants, and municipal stormwater systems. 19 For decades, EPA devoted
much of its attention to the monumental task of developing and enforcing
those technology-based standards. 2 0 The results, by most accounts, were
21impressive. ' Pollution loading from factories and wastewater treatment
plants has been greatly reduced (stormwater is another story), and in some
waterways, water quality has greatly improved. 22 But while EPA's
attentions-and those of the states-were focused on the NPDES program,
little happened with section 303. States did not even publish lists of
impaired waterways, let alone write TMDLs, and EPA did not step into the
void. 23 The agency had decided its efforts were better spent elsewhere.
In the 1990s, that all changed. Environmental groups filed a series of
lawsuits challenging states and EPA for their failures to prepare 303(d) lists
and TMDLs. 24 While some of the lawsuits initially failed, victories
15. Implementing Clean Water Act Section 303(d): Impaired Waters and Total Maximum
Daily Loads (TMDLs), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/tmdl
[https://perma.cc/LYT4-YKRD] (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e).
17. SarahBirkeland, EPA's TMDL Program, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 297, 316-17 (2001).
18. OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND
IMPLEMENTATION (1999).
19. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): Permit Limits, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-limits [https://perma.cc/J3HK-
36MS] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
20. HOUCK, supra note 18, at 12-24.
21. See, e.g., Johnathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 609,
618-21 (summarizing debates over the NPDES program's performance).
22. See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Success and Backlash: The Remarkable (Continuing)
Story of the Clean Water Act, 4 J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 25, 26 (2013).
23. HOUCK, supra note 18, at 49-56; e.g., Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865,
870-71 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (describing Georgia's progress, or lack thereof).
24. E.g., Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994); Scott v. City of
Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984); Friends of the Wild Swany. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 130 F.
Supp. 2d 1184 (D. Mont. 2001); Kingman Park Civic Ass'nv. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 84 F. Supp. 2d
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eventually came steadily, and the primary issue-often resolved in consent
decree negotiations-was not whether 303(d) lists and TMDLs must be
prepared, but how quickly. 25 And so a massive experiment was launched.
Now, over a decade after that first litigation phase was largely completed,
the states and EPA have tens of thousands of TMDLs, with more emerging
every day.26 In court cases, the primary issues now concern the content and
implications of TMDLs rather than the necessity of their preparation.27 The
Spokane River litigation, which does address that latter question, is a
throwback.2 8
All of this litigation reflected a hypothesis. The cases made strategic
sense for their environmental plaintiffs only if EPA was wrong about
TMDLs.29 Perhaps EPA was wrong because it simply misjudged TMDLs'
potential to produce environmental improvements. And perhaps EPA-or
more likely, the states-had not misjudged TMDLs' potential, but lacked
the political will to embark on a program that would antagonize powerful
industries. 30 But if TMDLs really were just a distraction from more
promising efforts to address water quality, then bringing those lawsuits was
a mistake, no matter how winnable they were.
At the time, there were some good reasons to believe that hypothesis
was correct. Environmental advocates had accumulated plenty of
experience then-and have accumulated more since-in using litigation to
instigate regulatory initiatives that eventually provided important
1 (D.D.C. 1999); Idaho Sportsman's Coal. v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 1996);
Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865.
25. When I interned at the Sierra Club's legal office in the summer of 2000, the club was
involved in negotiating multiple consent decrees, and these timing questions were central.
26. As of April 5, 2016, EPA's TMDLs database puts the number of approved TMDLs at
69,289. That number is based on state reporting, however, and many of the state reports are quite dated.
The actual number therefore is probably much higher. National Summary of Impaired Waters and
TMDL Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://iaspub.epa.gov/waters10/attains nation cy.control?preport type=T#APRTMDLS
[https://perma.cc/H877-GY2E] (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) [hereinafter TMDL Database].
27. See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 792 F.3d 281, 310 (3d
Cir. 2015) (rejecting multiple substantive challenges to the Chesapeake Bay TMDL); Friends of the
Earth v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that TMDLs must include
daily load limits rather than using some other time increment).
28. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
29. An alternative hypothesis would be that the plaintiffs just brought the cases because
they were hoping to secure attorneys' fees, with environmental improvements as a secondary goal.
Having spent some time working with environmental groups during this time period, I am very skeptical
of that claim. Even at that time, attorneys' fees were much less important than donations in supporting
environmental groups' budgets. And an environmental non-profit is no place for an attorney that
cynical. There is much more money to be made elsewhere.
30. See generally HOUCK, supra note 18 (describing many examples of political opposition
to meaningful water quality regulation).
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environmental protections. 3 ' And this use of litigation flowed from the
basic premises and designs of environmental laws. The legislators who
crafted those laws had not drafted citizen suit provisions by accident. They
expected that sometimes litigation would be necessary to spur agencies to
action, and prior experience had sometimes validated their foresight.3 2 From
the get-go, TMDL litigation had its skeptics; many commentators registered
concerns about how efficacious Clean Water Act section 303 would ever
really be.33 But an attentive student of environmental law's then-short
history might have expected that litigation was about to launch another
important regulatory program.
II. 69,000 AND COUNTING
Decades later, the TMDL program is well past the launch phase.
According to the most recent-but already dated-estimate from EPA, over
69,000 TMDLs have been written.3 4 Many of those TMDLs are of very
recent vintage, and more time will need to elapse before anyone can fairly
evaluate their accomplishments.3 5 But others are older, and studies of those
older TMDLs provide some basis for preliminary judgments about what
TMDLs have wrought.3 6
Initially, one of the most striking features of many of the TMDL
implementation studies is not the answers they provide, but the questions
they ask. EPA, for example, has produced multiple studies that focus on
TMDL implementation.3 7 The question many of these studies ask is not
31. See Owen, supra note 6, at 483-84 (describing major watershed protection initiatives
that litigation helped spur); ROBERT MELTZ, FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIONS FOLLOWING THE SUPREME
COURT'S CLIMATE CHANGE DECISION IN MASSACHUSETTS V EPA: A CHRONOLOGY (2014).
32. See JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION (1971) (describing the theory behind citizen enforcement); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The
Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185 (describing the origins,
benefits, and problems associated with citizen suits and other citizen enforcement mechanisms).
33. See, e.g., Birkeland, supra note 17, at 314 ("[T]he TMDL program is burdened with all
of the problems inherent in any ambient-based regulatory system, with a few extra challenges tossed in
for good measure.").
34. TMDL Database, supra note 26. As noted earlier, that number is almost certainly low.
35. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEAN WATER ACT: CHANGES NEEDED IF KEY
PROGRAM IS TO HELP FULFILL THE NATION'S WATER QUALITY GOALS 14 (2013) [hereinafter GAO]
(showing cumulative numbers of TMDLs).
36. E.g., id.; JOHN HORNBEEK ET AL., MEASURING WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS:
TMDL IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS, INDICATORS, AND TRACKING 6 (2011) (listing multiple earlier
studies).
37. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FY20 10 NATIONAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING
TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS (TMDLS) (2011); LAURA BLAKE ET AL., STATE APPROACHES AND
NEEDS FOR MEASURING, TRACKING, AND REPORTING ON WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS 8 (2010);
DOUGLAS J. NORTON, WATER ENV'T FED'N, SAMPLING TMDL IMPLEMENTATION RATES AND
PATTERNS IN THE NORTH CENTRAL US 1309 (2009); OFFICE OF WETLANDS, OCEANS, & WATERSHEDS,
850 [Vol. 17
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whether TMDLs have improved water quality. Instead, it is whether
something-anything-has been done implement the TMDL.38 Particularly
for TMDLs focused on nonpoint source pollutants, the answer to that
question is often "no." 3 9 Additionally, EPA has surveyed its regional
TMDL staff to find out about levels of awareness of, and interest in,
TMDLs among staff at state and local planning offices, agricultural
agencies, and other governmental entities that might partner in TMDL
implementation. Those surveys revealed a widespread perception that the
very people who ought to be implementing TMDLs instead lack
understanding of, and commitment to, the TMDL program.4 0 For other
TMDLs, some type of implementation program exists, but many of the
studies do not measure that implementation program against metrics
designed to assess the likelihood of producing successful outcomes. 4' And,
as EPA often notes, information gaps are pervasive.42
Other studies do provide that second layer of analysis. One of the most
recent major studies is a General Accounting Office report from 2013.43
The authors surveyed state agency staff responsible for TMDL
implementation, and they also identified features thought to promote
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ANALYSIS OF TMDL IMPLEMENTATION RATES IN EPA REGION 5 (2009);
THE CADMUS GRP., INC., TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) IMPLEMENTATION TRACKING NEEDS
ASSESSMENT: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS FOR STATES IN REGION 5, 6, AND 10 (2008);
INDUS. ECON., INC., DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE NONPOINT SOURCE TMLDLS: AN EVALUATION OF THE
TMDL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (2007); Valentina Cabrera-Stagno, Developing Effective TMDLs: An
Evaluation of the TMDL Process, PROC. WATER ENV'T FED'N, TMLDL 2007 443 (2007); U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, REGION 10, WATERSHED PROT. UNIT, IMPLEMENTATION OF WASHINGTON'S TMDL
PROGRAM, 1998-2003 (2005).
38. E.g., OFFICE OF WETLANDS, OCEANS, & WATERSHEDS, supra note 37, at iii; FY2010
NATIONAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS (TMLDLS), supra note 37.
39. See, e.g., HORNBEEK ET AL., supra note 36, at vi ("[E]xisting studies suggest that Total
Maximum Daily Load implementation for point sources tends to occur more reliably than for nonpoint
sources."); FY2010 NATIONAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS (TMDLS),
supra note 37, at 10 (finding that only eight percent of mapped nonpoint source TMDLs are associated
with an implementation project funded through section 319 of the Clean Water Act). The actual
implementation percentage may be somewhat higher; implementation can occur without a section 319
grant. But federal grants are likely to be one of the first sources would-be implementers look to-federal
money is usually a welcome thing-so those numbers probably provide at least a rough proxy for actual
implementation rates.
40. INDUS. ECON., INC., supra note 37, at ES-4 ("EPA TMLDL respondents consistently
ranked state and local planning agencies, state agricultural agencies, and USDA programs as
stakeholders/organizations with the least understanding of the TMDL program, lowest commitment to
achieve water quality standards based on TMDLs, and fewest action(s) taken to improve water quality
based on TMDLs.") (emphasis and parentheses in original).
41. For one exception, see HORNBEEK ET AL., supra note 36, at 4-5 (describing state
agency staff's perceptions about whether loading has decreased and water quality has improved).
42. See FY2010 NATIONAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS
(TMDLS), supra note 37, at 2 ("[M]any obstacles to comprehensive TMDL implementation tracking
exist....").
43. GAO, supra note 35.
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successful TMDLs and then chose a sample of TMDLs to compare to their
metrics of success. Their results were not encouraging, as the following
partial, but reasonably representative, sampling demonstrates:
* "EPA tracks basic information on TMDL development, such
as the number, location, and type of long-established TMDLs
but, generally, does not have information on the extent to
which the TMDLs have been implemented or have improved
the quality of impaired water bodies."
* "[S]tate TMDL coordinators do not know the extent to which
many long-established TMDLs have been implemented. For
those TMDLs where information exists, state coordinators
reported that pollutants had been reduced in many waters, but
few TMDLs had helped water bodies attain water quality
standards."
* "Long-established TMDLs often do not contain key features
that would help water bodies attain water quality standards, in
part because EPA's regulations and guidance do not direct
TMDLs to contain them.",4 6
* "As reported by state TMDL coordinators, the absence of two
key factors-specifically, legal authority and sufficient
funding-has generally stymied the implementation of
TMDLs meant to curtail nonpoint source pollution."4 7
Several authors have taken a different approach to reviewing TMDLs
and have focused on identifying successful TMDLs and trying to discern
what makes them work.4" By design, these studies are not representative;
they try to figure out what can be learned from the outliers. But the fact that
the authors did find successful TMDLs to review is at least modestly
encouraging, even if there is little reason to infer that those successes
extend to the thousands of TMDLs not selected for the studies.
44. Id. at 27.
45. Id. at 35.
46. Id. at 36.
47. Id. at 62.
48. See, e.g., Brian Benham et al., Lessons Learned from TMDL Implementation Case
Studies, 2 WATER PRAC. 1 (2008); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WETLANDS & WATER,
WATERSHED BRANCH, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS WITH STORMWATER SOURCES: A SUMMARY OF
17 TMDLS (2007); CTR. FOR TMDL & WATERSHED STUDIES AT VA. TECH, TMDL IMPLEMENTATION -
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS (2006).
852 [Vol. 17
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Finally, two other types of information are relevant to any inquiry about
TMDLs. The type of information is water quality data. Under Clean Water
Act section 305(b), states must monitor water quality in their rivers, lakes,
streams, and bays, and EPA aggregates the state reports to produce
nationwide summaries of water quality status and trends.4 9 These reports
also are not encouraging. They show that water quality problems remain
pervasive across much of the American landscape.5 0 They also show that
pollution sources that fall outside the reach of the NPDES program-and
therefore might be the central targets of TMDLs-are the primary culprits
for much of that water quality impairment. 5 ' To blame TMDLs for the
persistence of these water problems would be to oversimplify a complex
situation; these problems might have been even worse had TMDLs not been
prepared. But it is at least accurate to say that the problems that people
hoped TMDLs would solve have not, in fact, been solved.52
The second type of information addresses the costs of developing
TMDLs. Current aggregate data on those costs are not easy to find; EPA's
last comprehensive estimate of the cost of TMDL development comes from
a 2001 draft report, which predicts that aggregate state costs would level off
at between 68 and 75 million dollars per year.53 But that estimate is almost
certainly much too low. EPA predicated the assumption on an estimate that
an average TMDL would cost $52,000,54 while recent data suggest that for
California, at least, average TMDL development costs are now closer to 1.3
million dollars. 5 Everything is more expensive in California, of course, but
even if those estimates represent an upper bound, they suggest that EPA's
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1315(b).
50. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 9; see GAO, supra note 35, at 14 (chart
showing water quality trends).
51. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 9 (listing agricultural sources as the
leading cause of water quality impairment).
52. See GAO, supra note 35, at 62 (noting the lack of progress in nonpoint source
pollution).
53. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE NATIONAL COSTS OF THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY
LOAD PROGRAM (DRAFT REPORT) ii-iii (2001). EPA's cost estimates for implementing TMDLs are
much higher. Id. But given the uneven implementation of TMDLs, those estimates may not correspond
to anything actually occurring in the real world. They also may be far lower than the direct costs of
developing some alternative program that effectively regulates the pollution sources that TMDLs might
target. The financial benefits of such a program also might be quite large, but that is a question for
another analysis.
54. Id. at iii.
55. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD. & REG'L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BDS.,
CALIFORNIA TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR
2013 -2014 18 (2014) (showing cost data); Email from Greg Gearheart, Dir., Office of Info. Mgmt. &
Analysis, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, State Water Res. Control Bd., to Dave Owen (Oct. 21, 2015, 9:23
AM) ("Average (staff and contracts) cost per TMDL to be completed in CA is about $1.5M.")
(parentheses in original) (on file with Vermont Journal of Environmental Law).
2016] 853
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older estimates were off by a wide margin. EPA also predicated its estimate
on the assumption that approximately 36,000 TMDLs would be prepared,
and the current TMDL count is probably more than double that number,
with thousands more still in the works.5 6 While pinpointing the exact cost of
TMDL development probably is not possible-and while the number,
whatever it is, would pale in comparison to some other government
programs-the expense of developing TMDLs clearly is far from
negligible.
Those expenses also bring opportunity costs. To the extent that money
for TMDLs comes out of lump sum allocations to state or federal
environmental agencies, it could have been spent on environmental
protection in some other form. And there is no shortage of needs. To
provide just one example, state environmental enforcement efforts are
notoriously underfunded, and several million additional dollars per year
might go a very long way. 5 Whether that money would have been
effectively spent is another question; agencies do not always turn money
into good results. But at the very least, it is possible that alternative
expenditures would have been environmentally valuable.
While all of this may seem dismal, it is important to realize how much
we just do not know. The optimal TMDL studies would not just sample a
limited set of reports and examine their content. Instead, they might
compare water quality data from many watersheds with and without
TMDLs, controlling for other variables, all in hopes of discerning whether
the presence of TMDLs correlates with positive changes in water quality
status. No one has done that kind of study. 5" Additionally, the TMDL
experiment, while not entirely new, is still no further along than
adolescence. Sometimes regulatory programs take a long time to mature,
and the TMDL program of 2040 may be quite different from that which
exists today. And, finally, individual TMDLs do provide some basis for
optimism. Efforts like the Chesapeake Bay TMDL and the Lake Champlain
TMDL suggest that, at least sometimes, a TMDL may help regulators and
water quality advocates gain traction on water quality problems that had
been very difficult to resolve. But with all that said, there currently is little
evidence that the TMDL program is producing anything more than isolated
successes.
56. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 53, at ii.
57. David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93
N.C. L. REV. 1, 53-55 (2014) (describing limited and declining enforcement budgets).
58. I doubt that is for lack of interest, and the authors of TMDL studies have generally
been candid about the limitations of their methodologies. And I do not know whether such a study
would even be possible. One key question would be whether water quality databases with sufficient




So why these uneven (and obscure) results? One possible answer is that
it can be very difficult to discern the causal relationships between particular
provisions of environmental law and environmental changes in the real
world. 5 9 But suppose, for a moment, that an even simpler explanation is
correct, and that the evidence of success is sparse because successes have
been few and far between. That would not be entirely surprising, for section
303 of the Clean Water Act was not constructed particularly well in the first
place.
To understand that assertion, it is helpful to think about three primary
categories of pollution to which TMDLs often apply, and which also are
common sources of water quality problems. The first category-and, it
turns out, the category where TMDLs offer the best fit-includes the same
industrial and wastewater treatment plant discharges that the NPDES
program already regulates. The second category is nonpoint source runoff,
which includes pollution from forestry operations, agricultural stormwater,
and irrigation return flows from agricultural fields. The third category,
which occupies something of an intermediate position between nonpoint
source runoff and traditional point sources, is urban stormwater runoff
A. Traditional NPDES Sources
By nearly all accounts, the Clean Water Act's greatest successes have
come through the NPDES program, which applies specifically to point
sources of water pollutants. 60 The NPDES program prohibits unpermitted
point source discharges, and it establishes technology-based numeric
effluent standards for those discharges. Because those standards are
numeric, violations are clear-cut; rarely is there much ambiguity about
whether permit condition have been met.6 ' NDPES permits also require
dischargers to monitor their effluent levels and to report the results of their
monitoring. 62 The Clean Water Act backstops these requirements with
provisions allowing both governmental and citizen enforcement. 63 The
59. Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation ofEnvironmental Law, 2013
UTAH L. REv. 219, 278 (2013). Studies of TMDL implementation often note the challenges associated
with determining the actual water quality consequences of TMDLs. See, e.g., HORNBEEK ET AL., supra
note 36, at 4-5.
60. See, e.g., Cannon, supra note 21, at 621 ("Technology-based limitations have produced
substantial reductions . . . .").
61. William L. Andreen, Water Quality-Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 55
ALA. L. REv. 537, 549 (2004).
62. Id.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
2016] 855
VERMONT JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
entire system sets environmental law's gold standard for transparency and
enforceability. And TMDLs do play a part in that system.
When EPA and the states write NPDES permits, they begin with
technology-based standards for effluent. 65 Generally speaking, those
standards limit pollution based on the technological capabilities of
dischargers, not based on the vulnerabilities of receiving waters. But the
statute also calls for more stringent permits when technology-based
standards alone will not be sufficient to attain compliance with water
quality standards. That requirement exists with or without a TMDL; there
is no legal reason why regulators must wait for TMDLs to write water
quality-based effluent limitations ("WQBELs") into permits.6 " But a TMDL
should, in theory, make WQBELs easier to set. TMDLs create overall
pollution budgets for waterways, and those budgets should help regulators
as they figure out how much pollutant loading each NPDES permit holder
can contribute. 6 9 They also can provide an informational basis for water
quality trading systems, which generally allow NPDES permit holders to
trade effluent allocations with each other, or to acquire offsets from
nonpoint source dischargers. 70
EPA regulations bolster these connections between TMDLs and
NPDES permits. These regulations require subdivision of the overall
pollution budget into a load allocation, which covers nonpoint sources, and
a wasteload allocation, which covers point sources.71 The latter sub-budget
should in turn facilitate a more refined allocation of pollution limits to
specific NPDES permit-holders. The regulations also prohibit additional
discharges into impaired waterways unless the discharger can demonstrate
that "there are sufficient remaining pollutant load allocations to allow for
64. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 83, 103 ("Environmental enforcement by private citizens is highest for violations of the Clean
Water Act....").
65. Andreen, supra note 61, at 548.
66. Id.
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1312; 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d) (2011).
68. See 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (containing no mention of TMDLs).
69. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NPDES PERMIT WRITER'S MANUAL 6-30 (2010)
Memorandum from N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation to Reg'l Water Eng'rs, Bureau Dirs. &
Section Chiefs, Division of Water Technical and Operational Guidance Series (1.3.1): Total Maximum
Daily Loads and Water Quality-Based Effluent Limits 2-3 (July 8, 1996) (explaining links between
TMDLs and WQBELs).
70. BOBBY COCHRAN & TIM MARTIN, BUILDING A TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD TO
BETTER SUPPORT WATER QUALITY TRADING 3, 4 (2014). Water quality trading generally allows
entities that can reduce pollutant loading relatively cheaply to cut pollution more than would otherwise
be required and to then sell credits to other entities for whom pollution reductions are more costly. U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT FOR PERMIT WRITERS 4 (2007).
71. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(e), (g)-(i) (defining load and wasteload allocations, and defining
the TMDL as the sum of the load and wasteload allocations and a margin of error).
856 [Vol. 17
TMDL Introduction
the discharge; and existing dischargers into that segment are subject to
compliance schedules designed to bring the segment into compliance with
applicable water quality standards." 72 In practice, that prohibition links a
state's ability to permit new development to its implementation of existing
TMDLs.73
But how much are TMDLs actually changing the water quality impacts
of NPDES permit holders? Despite these regulatory linkages, the question
is difficult to answer. There are reasons to suspect widespread benefits;
most importantly, the mandatory nature of WQBELs creates a potentially
direct connection between the information in TMDLs and actual controls on
discharging facilities. But there are also reasons for skepticism. First, the
legal link between water quality standards and WQBELs does not depend
on the presence of a TMDL, so even if WQBELs are improving water
quality, TMDLs cannot necessarily claim to be part of the causal chain.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, WQBELs impact a set of
dischargers that already is subject to technology-based standards, some of
which are quite stringent.75 The impacts of TMDLs on many permits
therefore may be marginal.
The balance of these factors is nearly impossible to discern, at least
based on existing information. There is surprisingly little empirical research
on how WQBELs actually are affecting water quality; and while the
literature on TMDL implementation generally finds higher implementation
rates for point source discharges, that literature also has very little to say
about actual water quality improvements.7 Consequently, the front where
TMDLs might actually be most effective has gone largely unstudied.
72. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(h)(2)(i).
73. See Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. EnytI. Prot. Agency, 504 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a new permit could not issue because of the lack of compliance schedules for existing
permittees in the same watershed). If a state has not yet prepared a TMDL for an impaired waterway,
that particular mandate does not apply, though new sources still cannot impair water quality. See In re
Cities of Annandale and Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for the Discharge of Treated
Wastewater, 702 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 731 N.W.2d 502
(Minn. 2007).
74. GAO, supra note 35, at 35 (noting state regulators' perceptions that wasteload
allocations are actually being implemented).
75. See Cannon, supra note 21, at 614 ("The CWA's policy apparatus now squeezes
increasingly expensive increments of improvements from point sources. . . .
76. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
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B. Nonpoint Source Runoff
When the TMDL era began, nonpoint sources were often the centers of
attention.7 7 Agricultural pollution was then, as it is now, a huge source of
water quality impairment,' and agricultural pollution is almost entirely
exempt from the Clean Water Act's permitting requirements for point
sources. 7 9 Another mechanism was needed, and TMDLs were the great
hope.o In some places, those hopes have been validated, at least partially;
TMDL-based regulation of nonpoint sources does exist.8' But it is rare.82
The reasons why stem partly from the statutory structure. Clean Water
Act section 303 mandates the identification of impaired water bodies, the
creation of TMDLs for those water bodies, and the existence of continuing
planning processes for improving water quality in those water bodies.83
Other sections of the Clean Water Act also authorize federal grants for
addressing nonpoint source pollution. 4 But nowhere in the Clean Water
Act is there a mandate for putting those plans into effect. 85 An
implementation plan does not become a binding set of requirements, as
would occur under otherwise analogous provisions of the Clean Air Act. 6
A state that fails to attain water quality standards faces no threat of lost
funding (other than EPA's grants for nonpoint source pollution, which are
77. See, e.g., Seema Mehta, Ocean Cleanup May Reach More than 100 Miles Inland, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2001), http://articles.1atimes.com/2001/jan/17/local/me-13425 [https://perma.cc/C2RC-
AVSL] (describing TMDLs as "limits for pollution sources such as farms, nurseries and cities that were
largely ignored in earlier enforcement efforts").
78. See Andreen, supra note 61, at 563-64 (describing water quality problems in the early
2000s).
79. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (exempting "agricultural stormwater discharges and return
flows from irrigated agriculture" from the Clean Water Act's definition of point sources, and thus from
regulatory coverage under the NPDES program).
80. See, e.g., Mehta, supra note 77 (quoting NRDC attorney David Beckman: "'This is
cutting edge. . . . [The limits] are intended to actually accomplish the fundamental goal of the Clean
Water Act-to make water safe for swimming, fishing and other uses people like. It's because they have
teeth that there's opposition to virtually every TMDL I can think of."') (brackets in original).
81. See, e.g., N. COAST REG'L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., NORTH COAST IMPAIRED
WATERS & TMDL PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2013 - 2014 ACCOMPLISHMENTS,
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/northcoast/water issues/programs/tmdls/pdf/141205/140807_RMF_FY
13-14TMDLYearEndEssayForEORptB.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GSR-AN4Y] (describing TMDL
implementation efforts, including several programs focused on nonpoint source discharges).
82. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (describing multiple reports finding that
TMDL implementation for nonpoint sources is particularly rare).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (authorizing the section 319 grant program).
85. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) ("States must implement
TMDLs only to the extent that they seek to avoid losing federal grant money; there is no pertinent
statutory provision otherwise requiring implementation of § 303 plans or providing for their
enforcement.").
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (2012) (requiring enforceable controls).
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not very large) or of a federal takeover of plan implementation. Nor is
there any requirement that water quality planners demonstrate that plans, if
implemented, actually would reduce nonpoint source pollution enough to
attain compliance with water quality standards." The TMDLs and plans
just have to exist.
The absence of a mandate is not a matter of coincidence or oversight,
for Clean Water Act section 303 was designed to leave a substantial and
discretionary role for the states.89 And states can give TMDLs teeth if they
want to; all it takes is state legislation linking completed TMDLs to
mandatory controls on nonpoint sources. But such legislation is rare. In
preparing this article, I searched Westlaw's databases of state statutes for
every reference to TMDLs and reviewed those statutory sections for any
provisions mandating that TMDLs be turned into nonpoint source controls.
I found almost nothing. Only two states-Vermont and Virginia-have
statutory language drawing such links explicitly. 90 One other-California-
had state statutory language that regulators have interpreted as establishing
such links. 91 But more common, in my search, was language like the
following blunt proclamation of the Arizona Revised Statutes: "Any
reductions in loading from nonpoint sources shall be achieved
voluntarily." 92
Of course, mandates can come from sources other than explicit
statutory language. Sometimes regulators can do creative work with
87. But see § 7410(c) (requiring federal implementation plans if state plans are not
submitted or are inadequate).
88. But see § 751 la(c)(2)(A) (stating that air quality plans must "provide for attainment of
the ozone national ambient air quality standard by the applicable attainment date," and requiring a
modeled demonstration that attainment will actually occur).
89. See HOUCK, supra note 18, at 14-24 (describing the history of Clean Water Act section
303).
90. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-104.8 (2011) (requiring plans to implement the Chesapeake
Bay TMDL); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 1386(a) (2016) (requiring plans for implementing the Lake
Champlain TMDL).
91. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., POLICY FOR
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM 6-7
(explaining the agency's interpretation of the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act). At Vermont
Law School's 2015 TMDL symposium, participants who were familiar with Florida's implementation
practices commented that their state had integrated regulation of nonpoint sources into its TMDL
program.
92. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 49-234(G) (2002); see IDAHO CODE § 39-3611(10) (2015)
("Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as requiring best management practices for agricultural
nonpoint source activities which are not adopted on a voluntary basis . . . ."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-
2007 (2012) (authorizing the appointment of a staff person to "implement voluntary incentive based
conservation programs"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-703(8) (1997) (calling for "a voluntary program of
reasonable land, soil, and water conservation practices to achieve compliance with water quality
standards for nonpoint source activities for water bodies that are subject to a TMDL developed and
implemented pursuant to this section").
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ambiguous statutory provisions. But that will only happen if regulators have
at least arguable statutory authority to impose such controls and if they
operate in a political context where such controls are allowable. Just how
often those circumstances arise is a question this article cannot definitively
answer, but they do not appear to be common. In many states, legislation
explicitly forbids state agencies from imposing any regulatory controls that
exceed the minimum levels mandated by federal law. 93 In many states, also,
the current political climate is not at all supportive of environmental
regulation. 94 It would take a bold bureaucrat to defy those laws, or that
culture, and impose discretionary controls on agricultural polluters. And
retrospective studies of TMDL implementation for nonpoint sources
suggest that such boldness is not occurring very often.95
And yet, boldness does occur sometimes. Pronsolino v. Nastri, the case
that most succinctly summarizes the limitations of section 303, also hints at
the potential: the TMDL at issue in that case actually did lead to significant
controls on nonpoint source pollution from silvicultural activities.9 6 Indeed,
the North Coast Regional Water Quality Board-the California regional
agency responsible for implementing that TMDL, and many others-has
used the Garcia River TMDL as an important first step down a path toward
broader regulation of nonpoint source pollution. 97 Much farther east,
implementation of the Chesapeake Bay TMDL-probably the most
ambitious and highest-stakes TMDL ever prepared-will include controls
on nonpoint sources.98 And, as the articles in this issue demonstrate, real
controls on nonpoint sources are integral to implementation of the TMDL
93. See William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and Preemption, 3
ENVT. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y 261, 279-80 (2008) (describing such laws).
94. See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, Ash Spill Shows How Watchdog Was Defanged, N.Y. TlVIES
(Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/us/coal-ash-spill-reveals-transformation-of-north-
carolina-agency.html [https://perma.cc/83TJ-YQQ3] (describing political pressures against
environmental regulation in North Carolina); Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Neglected, at a Cost in
Suffering, N.Y. TIrvIES (Sept. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13water.html?_r-0
[https://perma.cc/LHX7-TKEX] (describing political issues and public health consequences in West
Virginia and other states).
95. E.g., GAO, supra note 35, at 35 ("[state agency] coordinators reported that a higher
proportion of long-established point source TMDLs helped water bodies attain water quality standards
than did nonpoint source TMDLs.").
96. See 291 F.3d at 1129-30. ("In order to comply with the Garcia River TMDL, Forestry
and/or the state's Regional Water Quality Control Board required, among other things, that the
Pronsolinos' harvesting permit provide for mitigation of 90% of controllable road-related sediment run-
off and contain prohibitions on removing certain trees and on harvesting from mid-October until May
1.").
97. See generally JONATHAN WARMIERDAm, N. COAST REG'L WATER QUALITY CONTROL
BD., GARCIA RIVER WATERSHED AND SEDIIENT TMDL ACTION PLAN (May 5, 2010),
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/academy/courses/mtshasta/0505 10jwarmerdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LD52-9FJT] (PowerPoint describing implementation activities).
98. See Am. Farm Bureau Fedn, 792 F.3d 281 (describing the TMDL).
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for Lake Champlain. These efforts demonstrate beyond doubt that nonpoint
source regulation can be done and that TMDLs can be part of the regulatory
process. But these efforts also seem to be outliers.
C. Urban Stormwater
A third major category of pollution sources does not fit neatly into
either of the analytical categories described above. One of the leading
causes of water quality impairment-the leading source, in the areas where
most people live and work-is urban stormwater pollution. 99 Legal
commentators often lump urban stormwater runoff into the larger category
of nonpoint source pollution, but that is mostly incorrect; most urban
stormwater discharges through point sources. 00 But the laws and physical
realities of urban stormwater are sufficiently different from those of other
point sources that urban stormwater generates its own distinctive problems
and merits its own separate discussion.' 0'
The problems with urban stormwater TMDLs arise partly because of
mismatches between the requirements of section 303 and the nature of
urban stormwater pollution. Section 303 is highly specific in its
prescriptions: states must set daily loading budgets for individual
pollutants.1 0 2 That is a sensible system for discrete pollutants that arnive in
predictable increments. 03 But stormwater tends to move in erratic pulses,
and those pulses typically contain cocktails of different pollutants, all of
which interact to degrade waterways.i04 Some of the stressors associated
with urban stormwater runoff also do not meet the Clean Water Act's
definition of pollutant.i0 ' Excess flow, for example, is an excellent proxy
for pollutant levels and also is a major stressor for many urban
99. See Owen, supra note 6, at 441-44 (describing the pervasiveness of urban stormwater
pollution).
100. Dave Owen, Stormwater, Point Sources, and the Importance of Getting Terms Right,
ENVTL. L. PROF BLOG (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental law/20 14/02/stormwater-point-sources-and-the-
importance-of-getting-terms-right.html [https://perma.cc/N3AU-FMJ4].
101. See generally Owen, supra note 6, at 445-54.
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
103. See Wendy E. Wagner, Stormy Regulation: The Problems that Result when Stormwater
(and Other) Regulatory Programs Neglect to Account for Limitations in Scientific and Technical
Information, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 191, 201 (2006) (describing some of the advantages of the NPDES
program).
104. Owen, supra note 6, at 446-47.
105. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (defining "pollutant" to include "dredged spoil, solid waste,
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial,
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water").
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waterways.' 0 6 But flow is not itself a pollutant.'0 7 Despite those challenges,
TMDLs can be written for stormwater-impaired streams. 0 S But during past
research projects, regulators bluntly, and repeatedly, told me they found the
TMDL requirements to be a misfit for urban waterways.1 09
Regulators' efforts to work around that mismatch also face legal
impediments. One creative solution to the challenges of stormwater TMDLs
is to create a proxy TMDL, which uses some other watershed feature-
typically stormwater flow levels or impervious cover-as a proxy for
pollutant loading. 110 As I have argued elsewhere, this approach makes
scientific sense, for it focuses attention on root rather than intermediate
causes of impairment, and policy sense, for it can produce budgets that
municipal planners might actually use.ii But proxy TMDLs have raised
legal questions. Most prominently, a federal district court in Virginia
recently held that EPA's use of a proxy TMDL for Accotink Creek was
arbitrary and capricious.112 The Clean Water Act, the court noted, required
TMDLs for pollutants, and EPA's proxy-flow-was not a pollutant." 3 As
a district court decision, the case holds no precedential value, and other
courts might reach different results. 14 But, at the very least, the decision
signals that proxy TMDLs occupy a legal gray zone, and it may persuade
states and EPA to retreat from what initially seemed like promising policy
*115innovations.
106. See Owen, supra note 6, at 452-53 (noting the problem).
107. Id.
108. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 48 (providing case studies of stormwater
TMDLs).
109. Owen, supra note 6, at 453-54.
110. See, e.g., CONN. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., A TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD ANALYSIS
FOR EAGLEVILLE BROOK, MANSFIELD, CT (2007) (using impervious cover as a proxy); VT. DEP'T OF
ENVTL. CONSERVATION, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD TO ADDRESS BIOLOGICAL IMPAIRMENT IN
POTASH BROOK, CHITTENDEN COUNTY 4-5 (2006) (using flow as a proxy).
111. Owen, supra note 6, at 462-63.
112. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 1:12-CV-775, 2013 WL 53741,
at *7 (E.D. Va. 2013).
113. Id. at *4-*9.
114. While I have discussed issues with the legality of proxy TMDLs, see Owen, supra note
6, at 463-64, I think the district court was too quick to dismiss arguments favoring the legality of the
Accotink Creek TMDL. In that particular TMDL, EPA was using flow as a proxy measure for a specific
pollutant (sediment). That strikes me as a different situation than if EPA was using flow as a proxy for a
suite of stressors, some of which are not pollutants. But that distinction did not seem important to the
district court. See Dave Owen, An Important Stormwater Case (and It's not the One You 're Thinking
of), ENVTL. L. PROF BLOG (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental law/2013/01/an-important-stormwater-case-and-its-
not-the-one-youre-thinking-of.html [https://perma.cc/K3DC-NRKT] (discussing the Accotink Creek
decision).
115. See Owen, supra note 6, at 463-64.
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Urban stormwater TMDLs also face a significant additional challenge:
the mechanisms for translating them into controls on individual sources are
weak. That might initially seem like a surprising statement, for, as
explained above, urban stormwater largely discharges through point
sources, and point source permits generally must contain limitations
designed to implement water quality standards and, therefore, TMDLs.1 6
But for two reasons, that linkage is weaker with urban stormwater. The first
reason is that many point source discharges are not part of the NPDES
program. Clean Water Act section 402(p) creates a convoluted regulatory
structure for stormwater runoff, and the upshot of that structure is that only
a subset of stormwater point sources require NPDES permits. 117 Some
major categories of sources-for example, developed sites in smaller
municipalities or in census tracts with low population density-are
exempt. 118 Second, courts have held that the NPDES program's
requirements for WQBELs are not mandatory for municipal stormwater
discharges, even if those stormwater discharges are subject to NPDES
permitting. 119 Those holdings weaken what might otherwise be a powerful
mechanism for turning TMDLs into enforceable controls.
Again, all of these obstacles have not prevented states from addressing
urban stormwater in some TMDLs. Regulators in California, for example,
have taken aggressive-and controversial-steps to use TMDLs as the
basis for limitations on litter.12 0 In Vermont, regulators have stood by their
proxy TMDLs, notwithstanding legal controversies elsewhere about their
use. The Chesapeake Bay TMDL should spur major steps to address urban
stormwater pollution.121 But each of these efforts involves state or local
regulators with an independent commitment to water quality protection. For
a recalcitrant state, the spurs to action remain limited.
116. See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p).
118. Owen, supra note 6, at 449.
119. See Defs. of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1999) ("In conclusion
. . . Congress did not require municipal storm-sewer discharges to comply strictly with 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(1)(C)."); Md. Dep't of the Env't v. Anacostia Riverkeeper, 112 A.3d 979, 990-92 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2015), rev'd on other grounds, 2016 WL 929349 (Md. 2016).
120. City of Arcadia v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (considering, and mostly upholding, a TMDL for trash in the Los Angeles River).
121. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD
FOR NITROGEN, PHOSPHOROUS AND SEDIMENT 8-14 to 8-15 (2010) (describing limits on urban
stormwater pollution); Donna Peterson, Arlington County Taking Lead in Curbing Runoff to Potomac
River and Chesapeake Bay, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
state-of-nova/post/arlington-county-taking-lead-in-curbing-runoff-to-potomac-river-and-chesapeake-
bay/2012/08/13/cc86l5ce-e564-1lel-936a-b80lflababl9 blog.html [https://perma.cc/24U3-7XPZ]
(discussing municipal efforts to curb stormwater runoff).
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IV. LESSONS
The history of environmental law is filled with success stories. The
United States has achieved major improvements in air quality while the
economy has continued to grow;1 22 many rivers are much cleaner than they
were in the late 1970s;1 23 and current practices for managing hazardous
waste make the sloppiness of generations past seem mind-boggling. 124
Many of those successes are readily traceable to specific statutory
provisions. But Clean Water Act section 303 does not yet seem to belong in
the environmental law hall of fame, and there are reasons to suspect, based
on the structural flaws described above, that it never well. That raises a
question, then: what can we learn from all the things TMDLs, and section
303 more generally, seem not to have achieved?
Of many possible answers to that question, the discussion below
focuses on just two. One involves designing statutes, and the other involves
the decisions litigants make about forcing those statutes' implementation.
A. Mandates and Work-Arounds
One of the most striking features of section 303(d) is its particularity. In
just a few words, the statute binds regulators to a single process: they must
specify a maximum daily load of specific pollutants. Nowhere in the statute
is there express permission for a state regulator to say, "what's impairing
water quality in this stream is flow fluctuations, or water withdrawals, or a
loss of riparian habitat, or dams, and calculating a daily pollutant load
doesn't make sense, so we're not going to do it." Nor-according to the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, at least-can regulators
say, "daily pollutant loads don't really make sense; let's use some other
time period." 25 Nor does a regulator have clear statutory authorization to
say, "we know the root problem of impairment and how we should go about
122. Clean Air Act Overview: Progress Cleaning the Air and Improving People 's Health,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/progress-cleaning-air-
and-improving-peoples-health [https://perma.cc/9BZY-5HXX] (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
123. See James Salzman, Why Rivers No Longer Burn: The Clean Water Act Is One of the
Greatest Success in Environmental Law, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2012 5:20 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health andscience/science/2012/12/cleanwateract_40th anniversary t
he greatest successin environmental law.html [https://perma.cc/UY74-FT99] (describing the
transformation of pollution control from 1969 to today).
124. I base this assertion on my own experience, prior to becoming a lawyer, performing
hazardous waste management audits and working on waste site cleanups. The differences from past to
current practices are dramatic.
125. Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 142 ("Daily means daily, nothing else."). But see




regulating it, so let's just go ahead and do that." 2 6 The statute presumes
that one regulatory method always works best, with other methods offering
supplements but not substitutes.
In historical context, that specificity makes some sense. In the early
1970s, Congress recognized that government agencies would be essential to
the project of implementing environmental law, and that the states would
need to be involved too, but reliance did not mean trust.1 27 So Congress
turned to highly specific mandates, often backstopped by petition and
citizen suit provisions, to ensure that state and federal agencies actually
carried out their mandates.1 28 For that reason, perhaps the most anomalous
feature of section 303(d) is not the specificity of its mandates but their
incompleteness. In other areas of environmental law, like the Clean Water
Act's provisions for regulating point sources or the planning provisions of
the Clean Air Act, the mandates extend not just to planning but also to
implementation. 129 Il section 303, Congress somewhat uncharacteristically
stopped short.
Four decades later, however, that level of distrust looks anachronistic.
EPA is not simply a timid expert, capable of regulating effectively if and
only if Congress tells it exactly what to do and how to do it. Instead, it does
things-often bold things-partly on its own initiative; it comes up with
regulatory techniques that Congress might not have contemplated; and,
sometimes, it exercises restraint for sensible reasons.130 Other agencies can
and do exercise similar judgment. 131 Spurs to action still clearly have a
place in environmental law. But to bind an entire regulatory process within
a narrow statutory straitjacket no longer makes much sense.
And there are alternatives. Section 303(d) could have been constructed
to require EPA and the states to prepare TMDLs or, if they explained why
126. States can prioritize among streams, and the resulting latitude does provide some
flexibility for EPA or a state to prepare higher-value TMDLs first. But, in theory at least, a TMDL is
eventually required for every impaired waterway.
127. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 87-91 (2004)
(describing widespread distrust of EPA).
128. See id. at 79-84; SAx, supra note 32 (providing an intellectual blueprint for many of
these accountability mechanisms).
129. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (setting forth requirements for state implementation plans).
130. EPA's Clean Power Plan (in my view, at least) exemplifies this: EPA used a creative
regulatory mechanism, and it also tried to push to, but not beyond, the limits of political and legal
feasibility. See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60).
131. See, e.g., Dave Owen, Little Streams and the Transformations of Environmental Law,
2016 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with Vermont Journal of Environmental Law) (describing a
largely agency-driven process of expanding regulatory protections for small streams); John D. Leshy,
The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the Interior: A Preliminary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199, 212-14
(2001) (describing changes to ESA implementation).
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the TMDL approach did not make sense, to adopt enforceable recovery
plans for impaired waterways. Similarly, it could have given regulators the
option of skipping TMDLs, and skipping planning entirely, if they
demonstrated that a regulatory program already in place would effectively
address impairment in the affected waterway. To put the point more
generally, the statute could have taken the same partial flexibility that
reformers have long demanded for the regulated community and extended it
to the regulators themselves: it could have established performance
standards for regulators while allowing those regulators to determine how
best to achieve those standards. 32 And, similarly, it could encourage more
effective regulation by allowing actual regulatory controls-and results-to
substitute for extra layers of regulatory process.
These alternative regulatory approaches would not be novel.' 33 The
Clean Air Act planning process, for example, allows some similar
flexibility, giving regulators discretion to select many of the elements of
state implementation plans, but backstopping that discretion by requiring a
demonstration that the plans will work. 134 Other statutes create
opportunities to substitute performance for process. Federal agencies often
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered
Species Act, for example, by reducing projects' environmental impacts so
that they do not exceed regulatory thresholds, thus avoiding what otherwise
would be complex regulatory procedures.'3 5 Sometimes those workarounds
are controversial. 3 6 But TMDL implementation provides a stark reminder
that the absence of a workaround can mean compelling agencies to allocate
resources in rather sub-optimal ways. As environmental law grows up, that
kind of narrow mandate is increasingly dated.
132. See CARY COGLIANESE ET AL., PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION: PROSPECTS AND
LIMITATIONS IN HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1-2 (2002) (describing the push
for performance standards; the report also identifies circumstances where performance standards would
not make sense).
133. See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and
Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943 (2003) (supporting
the use of penalty default regulatory structures, which use a somewhat blunt default legal arrangement
as an incentive for parties to craft solutions better tailored to their needs).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 74 10(a) (requiring assurances of attainment).
135. See, e.g., Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84
TULANE L. REV. 265, 295 (2009) (describing common mechanisms of NEPA compliance); U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., EARLY ACTION: CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS (2012),
http://www.fws.gov/southeast/candidateconservation/PDF/earlyactionCCAAbrochure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WN7S-P5VF] (describing candidate conservation agreements, which generally involve
using commitments to heightened conservation to avoid the listing of species as threatened or
endangered-and thus to also avoid all the procedural and substantive constraints a species listing
entails).
136. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333 (2004)
(summarizing (and partially disagreeing with) critiques of mitigated FONSIs).
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That insight may come too late for Clean Water Act section 303(d), for
sympathetic amendments to our foundational environmental laws rarely
gain much traction in the current Congress. 137 But if times change,
adjustments that give regulators less discretion about whether they address
water quality impairment and more discretion about how they do so would
make a lot of sense. Similarly, as legislators design other environmental
laws, the misconstruction of section 303 offers a useful reminder that giving
regulators a range of tools to choose from can sometimes be a wise idea.
B. Considering Litigation's Pathways
The other key lessons apply to litigators. TMDL litigation was a grand
experiment, and its core hypothesis-that requiring TMDLs would lead to
significant and systemic improvements in water quality-has not been
proven. If it remains unproven or, worse, is proven false, then
environmentalist litigators ought to take note, not just for TMDL litigation
but also across the fields of environmental and administrative law.
More than anything else, the uncertain outcomes of TMDLs underscore
the importance of considering what will happen after one wins a case. Will
the losing agency be compelled, not just to take some intermediate step
toward environmental protection, but also to see the regulatory process
through to actual environmental results?138 Will a victory create a default
prohibition on some kind of environmentally destructive action, thus
requiring regulated entities to obtain permission-and, most likely, comply
with protective conditions-before they act?13 9 Sometimes the answer to
one or both of those questions will be "yes," and then it may make sense to
spur even a highly reluctant regulator to act. But if victory will only compel
regulators to take some intermediate step that might or might not lead to
environmental results, filing suit may be unwise, even if environmentalists
are sure they can win. TMDLs exemplify this point. Only for one category
of sources-traditional NPDES discharges-did generating a TMDL create
a clear pathway to actual regulatory controls. 140 Other than that, the
prevailing litigators were just compelling the production of documents that
could sit, ignored, on dusty shelves.
137. Richard Lazarus, Environmental Law Without Congress, 30 J. LAND USE 15, 28-33
(2014).
138. The Endangered Species Act, which mandates protection for listed species, provides a
good example of such compulsion: winning a listing case means that species must receive protection.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1538 (2012) (providing mandatory protections for listed species).
139. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (categorically prohibiting pollutant discharges, unless the
discharger obtains and complies with a permit).
140. See supra Section III.
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The second, and related, lesson is to consider the culture of the agency
being challenged. Sometimes litigation compels reluctant agencies to act,
and sometimes it unleashes them.' 4 1 In the latter circumstance, it may not
matter quite so much that a victory will not compel a process that will
necessarily culminate in regulatory controls. But in the absence of an
agency culture sympathetic to the underlying goals of an environmental
case, taking off the leash will not do much good.
Here, TMDLs present a more complicated story. EPA clearly has
shown a commitment to the basic goals of TMDLs, and its TMDL
regulations do flesh out the basic statutory mandate. 14 2 In past regulatory
processes, EPA also came close to adding real teeth to TMDL
requirements; late in the Clinton Administration, EPA proposed rules that
would have further strengthened the TMDL program by demanding that
states provide reasonable assurances of actual implementation. 143 Those
rules did not last, but the fact that they almost became operable suggests
that litigants were not irrational in their hopes. 44
Nor were litigants crazy to expect that at least some of the fifty states
would embrace TMDL requirements and try to turn them into something
meaningful. Environmental politics vary tremendously from state to state,
and some of those states-Califomia is perhaps the best example-take
pride in their reputations as environmental leaders. 4 In addition to EPA
and the states, there are many other actors, both private and public, that
could turn TMDLs into documents with real meaning. 46 Sub-state actors,
other federal agencies, and watershed groups all could, and sometimes
have, taken TMDLs and turned them into stepping stones toward
environmental progress.
141. The Massachusetts v. EPA litigation against EPA arguably exemplifies the latter
dynamic. 549 U.S. 583 (2007). Many people working at EPA in the mid-2000s had the competence and,
most likely, the inclination to take steps toward addressing climate change, and the Supreme Court's
ruling gave them-eventually-the ability to begin taking those steps.
142. For example, the regulations call for load and wasteload allocations-requirements that
do not appear within the statute itself. See Am. Farm Bureau Fedn, 792 F.3d at 300 (finding these
regulatory requirements to be lawful).
143. See Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths that Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 64-66 (2002) (describing EPA's efforts).
144. See id. at 68-69 (chronicling the demise of the rulemaking effort).
145. See, e.g., Richard M. Frank, California & the Future of Environmental Law & Policy,
35 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 62 (2008) (describing California's leadership roles and also a few arenas in
which it is a laggard).
146. See Mark Lubell et al., Watershed Partnerships and the Emergency of Collective
Action Institutions, 46 AM. J. POLL SCI. 148, 149 (2002) (noting the existence-as of 2002-of 958
watershed partnerships in the United States).
147. See, e.g., KAJSA STROMBERG ET AL., NORTH FORK COEUR D'ALENE RIVER SUBBASIN




TMDL litigation, in short, was not obviously quixotic. Nevertheless,
the inescapable reality is that most TMDL lawsuits were compelling states
to take one additional, and partial, step in a process that they had never
wanted to begin in the first place, and that would not lead to water quality
protection without additional initiatives. Because of that history, any
assumption that many states would say, "well, we never wanted to do
TMDLs at all, but now that we're doing them, let's turn them into
meaningful regulatory documents," seems to have been far-fetched. 48
The point of this discussion is not condemn the litigators who sought to
compel TMDLs. Clearly, I am skeptical of the utility of the cases they filed,
but hindsight makes judgment all too easy. At the time, these litigators were
facing huge unresolved water quality problems and better options for
addressing nonpoint source pollution did not exactly seem abundant.
Litigation and lawmaking also are highly uncertain practices, and often one
cannot achieve a positive outcome without first engaging in the fight. But if
hindsight is no basis for condemnation, it is a useful basis for assessing the
future. And hindsight about TMDLs suggests the need for caution about
when environmental litigators sue, even if a case seems like it can be won.
CONCLUSION
This article's conclusions may seem a little belated. After all, Congress
and litigators did what they did, and with the TMDL program now in full
swing, the lessons of the past may matter less than finding ways to make a
flawed program work in the future. For that reason, the more important
story in this volume is about the Vermonters who are turning the TMDL
program, warts and all, into a viable tool of water quality improvement.
Strong institutions and smart individuals can sometimes conjure good
policy from weak law, and in the Lake Champlain basin, and elsewhere in
the country, many people are trying to do just that with TMDLs. Some have
already succeeded; others may yet do so.
But underlying legal structures still matter, and we can learn a thing or
two from the past. Here, the primary lesson is that a major environmental
program has not yet proven its worth. And while future studies may fill
what presently are large information gaps, and also may paint a more
north fork cda river sba watershed restoration effectiveness review_0913.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RV3H-N6MJ] (describing successful implementation of several TMDLs in Idaho);
VA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, TMDL PROGRAM SIx YEAR PROGRESS REPORT 2000 - 2006 (2007),
http://www.deq.state.va.us/Portals/O/DEQ/Water/TMDL/06prgrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/82HC-EM3B]
(providing detailed case studies showing water quality improvements).
148. See HOUCK, supra note 18, at 133-34 (quoting multiple Congressmen's observations
about the states' reluctance to protect water quality).
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positive picture, the presently-thin evidence of success offers cautionary
lessons for statutory and regulatory design and for litigants choosing future
battles. Sometimes a regulatory program just is not constructed to succeed,
at least not on a widespread basis, and occasionally, regulators may be right
to leave a mandate on the shelf
